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ALD-027        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
No. 13-3422 
___________ 
 
ANDRE MYERS, 
 
 Appellant. 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN MARIANA, FCI Loretto 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-00030) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 31, 2013 
 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed: November 21, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 O P I N I O N 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Andre Myers appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
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Western District of Pennsylvania that denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
will summarily affirm because no substantial question is presented by this appeal. 
 Myers was arrested on a federal offense in November 1999 and released on bond 
11 days later.1  On March 8, 2000, Myers was arrested by New York authorities for a 
parole violation.  Myers was transferred from state parole custody to the New York State 
Department of Corrections on June 9, 2000, to continue service of his original state 
sentence.  The State credited Myers with 93 days of jail time for the period of March 8, 
2000 through June 8, 2000.  The state parole board issued a notice on February 5, 2001, 
indicating that Myers had an “open date,” or “earliest release date” of March 8, 2001. 
 On March 12, 2001, while in state custody, Myers was “borrowed” on a writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum to answer the federal charges.  Myers was convicted 
following a jury trial and was sentenced to a 235-month term of imprisonment.  The 
judgment did not specify whether it was to run concurrent or consecutive to any other 
sentence.2  Myers was returned to state authorities on November 29, 2001.  Myers was 
released to federal custody on January 18, 2002, his maximum release date. 
 Myers filed this habeas petition seeking credit against his federal sentence for time 
served in state custody from March 9, 2001 to January 18, 2002.  Because Myers’ claim 
challenges execution of his sentence, it is cognizable in a § 2241 petition.  See McGee v. 
                                                 
1
 The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) later credited Myers’ federal sentence for these 11 
days.  On March 14, 2000, Myers was indicted and an arrest warrant was issued for his violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition).   
 
2
 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run 
consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently”; see also BOP 
Sentence Computation Manual at 31-33. 
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Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 935 (3d Cir. 2010).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We exercise de novo review over the denial of Myers’ habeas petition.  See 
Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 In calculating a federal prisoner’s sentence, the BOP determines (1) when the 
federal sentence commenced, and (2) whether there are any credits to which the prisoner 
may be entitled.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3585.  In the instant case, the BOP correctly determined 
that pursuant to § 3585(a), Myers’ federal sentence commenced on January 18, 2002, the 
date he was released to federal custody for service of his sentence.  See Rios v. Wiley, 
201 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] prisoner detained pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus ad prosequendum remains in the primary custody of the first jurisdiction unless 
and until the first sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction over the prisoner.”).  Pursuant to 
§ 3585(b), the BOP must give a defendant credit for any time that he spent in official 
detention prior to the date on which he commenced service of that sentence, as a result of 
the offense for which the sentence was imposed or any other charge for which he was 
arrested after he committed that offense, that has not been credited against another 
sentence.  That section expressly prohibits awarding a prisoner “double credit for his 
detention time.”  United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992).  As the District 
Court determined, all of the time that Myers served in custody has been credited toward 
either his state or his federal sentence, and he is not entitled to any additional credit. 
 Myers argues that he is entitled to credit for the ten-month delay between the date 
he was first eligible for parole and the date he was released from state custody, because 
the federal detainer prevented him from being considered and released for state parole.  
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Although § 3585 generally prohibits the award of “double credit,” some federal courts 
have held that credit toward a federal sentence should be given where the federal detainer 
alone caused continued state confinement.  See Shaw v. Smith, 680 F.2d 1104, 1106 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (credit against federal sentence required “if the continued state confinement 
was exclusively the product of such action by federal law-enforcement officials as to 
justify treating the state jail as the practical equivalent of a federal one.”) (citation 
omitted).3  We need not determine whether we would follow such reasoning, as Myers’ 
belief that he may have been granted earlier release on parole had he been in the custody 
of New York State in March 2001 is not supported by the record,4 and is simply 
insufficient to mandate that the BOP award such credit.  Moreover, although the federal 
sentencing court had the authority to account for this time period, there is no support for 
the argument that it intended to do so.   
 As no substantial question is presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
                                                 
3
 Shaw was decided before § 3585 was amended to explicitly prohibit double credit. 
 
4
 Myers relies on Rosemond v. Menifee, 137 F. Supp. 2d 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), where a 
petitioner was borrowed on a federal writ just two days prior to his conditional release 
date from state custody.  The state was without authority to release him while he was in 
temporary federal custody pursuant to the writ, but when he was returned to state 
custody, the state released him just two days later.  Given the facts presented, the 
Rosemond court held that the BOP could not “unilaterally lengthen a petitioner’s state 
sentence by use of a federal writ,” and that “to deny petitioner credit toward his federal 
sentence--for time that was not credited toward his state sentence which was lengthened 
solely by the actions of the federal authorities--would represent a manifest injustice.”  Id. 
at 275.  In contrast here, federal authorities did not “borrow” Myers until four days after 
his earliest release date.  And once Myers was returned to state authorities, they did not 
immediately release him, but waited until the day of his maximum release date, 
suggesting that the delay in his release was not due to any action by federal authorities. 
